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Production and hosting byEmpirical research in accounting has lately focused much on sophisticated sta-
tistical methodology and econometrics and relatively less on conceptualization
of the issues concerned. This essay is written to highlight the conceptualization
of the issues as an important ingredient of empirical research in accounting. I
present two methods of conceptualization – the single-entity approach and the
game theoretic approach. I give several examples in accounting research to
explain the conceptualization process. I hope that this essay will ﬁll a much
needed void in the research process in accounting and restore the balance
between conceptualization and methodology.
 2013 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of China Journal of
Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City Univer-
sity of Hong Kong.1. Introduction
This essay, as the title indicates, deals with the conceptual and philosophical aspects of accounting and
auditing research. It is deliberately written to focus on aspects of accounting research that do not concern sta-
tistics, statistical methodology, and econometrics. I am motivated to write this essay because younger
researchers, especially Ph.D. students, have begun to view the process of research and publication as a
mechanical production process deploying a sophisticated statistical methodology, whereas the selection and
conceptualization of the issues get relatively less focus. Continuing this trend might make accounting research
more focused on narrow topics that are amenable to statistical analysis while ignoring the larger issues thatction and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of China Journal of Accounting Research.
University of Hong Kong.
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(2013) who bemoans a similar progression in ﬁnance research thus:
 “Research students might once have discovered such issues for themselves, through curiosity and unstruc-
tured background reading, but the modern way of PhD research is much narrower and usually involves a
substantial commitment of time and thought to learning statistical techniques, and how to implement them
using diﬀerent software packages, and to cleaning, merging and reconstructing large data ﬁles. There is
obviously less time and appetite for philosophical critique, out of which potential research outcomes are
no doubt less ‘safe’ than those from a well-conceived empirical investigation.”
In this essay, I address the above concern by identifying the important ingredients of relevant empirical
research in accounting and giving several examples of how to conceptualize issues that are currently being
researched in the ﬁeld. In the interest of setting expectations from this essay, it is important for me to state
that I do not present much original work of my own here. I also do not fully develop the models that I present
here. My purpose is to highlight the importance of conceptualization in empirical accounting research and
show that it is possible to do so with some thought and basic common-sense-driven logic. In particular, it does
not need extensive quantitative theoretical modeling (though such a development is welcome) to have a con-
ceptual framework for empirical research.
1.1. The purpose of accounting research and the deﬁnition of conceptualization
What really is the purpose of accounting research? Accounting practice is more than 10,000 years old
(Dickhaut et al., 2010; Waymire and Basu, 2007) and has developed as part of the cultural and social orga-
nization of human beings. In its essence, accounting is the process of measuring, keeping records, and report-
ing transactions and performance by the more informed players in organizations to less-informed players who
might control the resources. The codiﬁcation of the double entry system by Pacioli has helped the ﬁeld to
adapt to the growing organizational complexity of both business and non-business entities as well as interac-
tions among them. In the context of such development, Ronen (2012) speaks of the objective of accounting
research as “helping to set accounting policy that maximizes social welfare by improving resource allocation.”
The implication of this objective is that accounting research should oﬀer guidance to policy makers based on
both theoretical and empirical research. It is therefore important to relate empirical research (the focus of this
essay) to social policy to claim relevance.
How can empirical accounting research beneﬁt social policy? We need to identify feasible information
exchanges that can direct resources controlled by less-informed parties to their maximally productive uses.
Such a task requires the accounting system to examine among others (i) the organizational forces that create
information diﬀerences – say, between managers and investors or between managers and regulators; (ii) the
incentives of the informed parties (managers, auditors) to transmit information to the less-informed but more
endowed parties (investors who hold capital, regulators who hold policy-making power); and (iii) the account-
ability and protection of the resources while in use or otherwise – the governance issue. Such examination
requires theoretically supported assumptions on human behavior as individuals and in teams as well as the-
oretically supported assumptions about market behavior in situations where individuals might not have the
power to aﬀect most outcomes. These assumptions naturally derive from known evidence in the psychology
literature (individual behavior), sociology (team behavior), and economics literature (individual and team
behavior under institutional constraints and market behavior). We refer to these assumptions as “maintained
hypotheses.” I later discuss their role in framing research questions in accounting. While theoretical research
might provide some clues on how diﬀerent policy prescriptions, reporting conventions, and voluntary disclo-
sures might aﬀect resource allocation in diﬀerent organizational contexts (diﬀerent ownership and capital
structures), empirical research serves to verify whether these theoretical predictions hold and if they do not,
whether the theory needs to be reﬁned.
I deﬁne “conceptualization of the issue” of a research project to mean the identiﬁcation of the underlying
assumptions (the maintained hypothesis) and the logical process of linking the potential outputs to inputs. I
deﬁne “methodology” as the selection of statistical techniques and packages to examine the relation between
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issue and the maintained hypothesis. All these aspects are essential ingredients of relevant accounting research.
1.2. The current framework of empirical research in accounting
The “real world” for which we seek betterment as researchers is typically very complex. There are myr-
iads of interacting systems and subsystems (the subsystem in accounting – part of the economic eco-system
– might be seen as a composite interacting set of the second level of subsystems – accounting standard-
setting system, standards enforcement system, the legal system, the auditing system, the governance sys-
tem, the regulatory framework and the political system; each second level subsystem consists of a number
of interacting third level subsystems – for example, the auditing subsystem can be construed as comprising
of audit education, auditor certiﬁcation, competition between auditors in the jurisdiction, the auditing
standards and the standard-setting system) each with several observable and unobservable, dynamically
changing, uncertain variables that constitute the real world. Current accounting research has adopted
the (western) philosophy of reductionism, wherein the researchers seek to understand parts of the system
and then examine how they interact. This “bottom-up” approach diﬀers from the Eastern philosophies
that emphasize holism where the overall system is studied ﬁrst and each subsystem derives its purpose
from the overall system. Further, in the reductionist philosophy, we seek to limit our examination to a
manageable number of observable variables – and assume that the eﬀects of other potential (omitted) vari-
ables are either inconsequential or get randomized in the analysis. This process of reducing the scope of
analysis to a limited number of variables is referred to as “modeling” and the hypothesized relationship is
referred to as a “model”.
For the current framework in accounting, I borrow from Ronen (2012). First, I distinguish between nor-
mative and descriptive models. Normative models aid decision-makers by restricting the set of choices that
they need to consider in making decisions, whereas descriptive models examine the current choices and iden-
tify the relationships that exist between those choices and the context in which those choices were made. Most
empirical research in accounting falls in the “descriptive” category. A particular subset of descriptive empirical
accounting research is known as “positive accounting research.” Positive accounting research has a theoretical
base in the contractual view of ﬁrms – that every ﬁrm is a nexus of contracts. Managerial actions are explained
in a framework where managers are assumed to be acting in their self-interest and are characterized by
rational expectations within the conﬁnes of their contractual stipulations. Note that positive accounting
researchers do not claim to “prescribe” behavior, and therefore, this kind of research is part of the descriptive
category. The ultimate diﬀerence between normative and descriptive research has been questioned (Churchman,
1961). One could also argue that normative prescriptions are seen as “rational” by management students and
managers who will conform to that behavior in making the prescriptions actually descriptive in practice over
time (Ghoshal, 2005).
Ronen (2012) explores accounting research in the framework given in Fig. 1.
In this framework, rational-expectations modeling is placed in the northwest cell where managers and
investors are viewed as economically rational players acting in their self-interest with no behavioral biases.
Most of the studies that fall in this cell are analytical studies. Empirical studies that show no deviation from
market eﬃciency and no economic irrationality on the part of managers are diﬃcult to publish because of the
“lack of contribution.” Hence, we hardly ﬁnd any published empirical–archival or empirical–experimental
accounting studies that do not ﬁnd deviations from expected behavior.
Studies that ﬁnd opportunistic earnings management seem to assume that markets do not see through
such opportunism. If they did, the stock price would not respond to managed earnings and if the stock
price did not respond, the manager would not undertake the cost and eﬀort involved in managing earn-
ings. Therefore, these studies fall in the category where managers are considered rational but investors are
either naive or do not care enough to see through the managed earnings. (Note that informative earnings
management falls in the cell where both managers and investors are modeled as rational.) A particular
naivete´ that is often attributed to investors is called “Functional Fixation”. Believers in functional ﬁxation
assume that investors focus on reported earnings (and other ﬁnancial statement numbers) but do not con-
sider how that earnings number is derived. Unexplained anomalies such as accruals anomaly (Sloan, 1996)
         Managers  
Markets (Investors) 
WISE 
(Enlightened self-interest 
maximizers – conforming to 
individual rationality as 
currently understood in the 
Economics literature – Homo 
Economicus) 
FOOLISH 
(Managers exhibit behavioral 
deviations from individual 
rationality and/or bounded 
rationality)
WISE 
(Conforming to the Market 
Efficiency Hypothesis) 
Analytical equilibrium 
modeling 
Tests of models with rational 
parties 
Signaling, optimal 
compensation, optimal 
performance measures etc. 
Tests of market efficiency 
with respect to accounting 
numbers 
The market sees through 
attempts to manipulate 
accounting numbers 
Value relevance: association 
tests 
FOOLISH 
(Investors exhibit behavioral 
biases and/or bounded 
rationality which is not 
overcome by market forces. As 
a result, the market might not 
conform to the Market 
Efficiency Hypothesis) 
Pernicious earnings 
management, pernicious 
smoothing 
Accounting-market anomalies: 
accruals anomaly, price-
earnings ratios, price-CFO 
ratios etc.  
Difficult to test: Management 
does not attempt to fool the 
market, when in fact the 
market could be fooled. 
Figure 1. A Conceptualization Framework (from Ronen, 2012 – the notation in italics are added by me).
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courts in the US (and most countries) have held the view that managers can fool investors. Based on this
view, they have sought to constrain managerial reporting – under the notion of “protecting the unin-
formed investor”, presumably from smart and manipulative managers.
The northeast cell where the market is assumed to be eﬃcient but managers are not fully rational is pop-
ulated by several early “event-study” accounting papers such as Ball and Brown (1968). The logic in these
studies runs thus: the market is eﬃcient and prices move only when there is unanticipated information (news);
therefore, to the extent that accounting earnings changes are associated with changes in market returns, there
is information content in accounting. By implication, any report that moves the market is informative and any
report that is discarded by the market is non-informative. Managing the earnings report is fruitless because the
market sees through and disregards these changes and only a naı¨ve manager would still try to manage the
report.
The trend in empirical research in accounting is to explore deviations from market eﬃciency (behavioral
biases of investors) or to explore the behavioral biases of managers. In the southeast cell, the researcher
assumes that both investors and managers are driven by behavioral biases. There are few empirical studies that
do this, because of the lack of consensus on behavioral theories that predict speciﬁc deviations for both inves-
tors and managers.
The above framework presents the overarching maintained assumptions underlying most of the empirical
studies in accounting. In the next section, I discuss the role of maintained hypothesis in conceptualizing a
research question. In Section 3, I explain the conceptualization of research questions using a single-entity
approach. In Section 4, I discuss the conceptualization of research questions using game theoretic models
where the focal entity is modeled as one of two or more strategic players. Conclusions are given in the last
section.
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Conceptualization of a research question is done in a framework that is shaped by an assumed theoretical
basis that will not be explicitly tested in the paper. This underlying theory2 is referred to as the maintained
hypothesis and is usually accepted well enough to not need a defense in the study. As an example, consider
the case where you empirically examine the eﬀect of an accounting standard – expensing of research and devel-
opment expenditure – on the decision of how much to spend on research and development. Two possible
maintained hypotheses are possible. First, let Functional Fixation be the maintained hypothesis. Under this
assumption, the investors are unable to fully understand the valuation implications of the research and devel-
opment expenditure and depend on the reported accounting income to derive their valuation. Under this
maintained hypothesis, the following claims could be made: (i) ﬁrms with high research and development
expenditures that are immediately expensed will be undervalued; (ii) allowing capitalization will increase their
reported income and make investors increase their valuations of the ﬁrms. Anticipating this, managers will be
more reluctant to undertake research and development expenditures in the former case (expensing) but less so
in the latter case (capitalization). These claims allow us to hypothesize that under the maintained hypothesis of
functional ﬁxation, having an expensing rule for R&D expenditures will depress the R&D activities under-
taken by research-based ﬁrms under that regime. Allowing capitalization will correspondingly boost R&D
expenditure. However, if the maintained hypothesis is the eﬃcient market hypothesis, we cannot use the above
argument in our conceptualization. Investors will properly evaluate the research and development expenditure
irrespective of whether the amount is expensed or capitalized or partially capitalized. However, under this
assumption, we could invoke signaling implications to explain why allowing partial capitalization might be
useful. Allowing such capitalization could provide managers with the means of communicating their successes
in R&D projects in a credible manner without incurring signiﬁcant proprietary costs. As a result, investors,
using signals can better evaluate ﬁrms than if either expensing or capitalization were mandated. As you can
see from this discussion, the same empirical result is theoretically supported in two diﬀerent ways depending
on the maintained hypothesis chosen to explain it. It is important to mention that the maintained hypothesis
of functional ﬁxation generally needs greater justiﬁcation than the maintained hypothesis of eﬃcient markets.
The maintained hypothesis could be diﬀerent in diﬀerent contexts. For example, the political setting and the
economic infrastructure in China are such that most of the capital resources are controlled by the State. The
maintained hypothesis of free markets has limited applicability in China. A private ﬁrm operating in the Chi-
nese market might well depend on political connections and inﬂuence to gain access to capital and resources
rather than appealing to investors by being transparent. In fact, exposure of political connections and extra-
legal dealings could expose the connected individual and the ﬁrm to extreme penalties, and therefore, it might
be in the interest of both parties to be opaque. The maintained hypothesis here is one of political rent-seeking
rather than the free market economy.
The maintained hypothesis allows us to hypothesize the predicted behavior of the entity in question as well
as the behavior of the environment in which the entity is situated. In the next section, I will discuss the case
where the environment is characterized by uncertainty but is not modeled to consist of strategic players. In the
subsequent section, I discuss the case where the environment consists of strategic players.2 Normally, the term “hypothesis” is a tentative idea awaiting conﬁrmation or falsiﬁcation whereas “Theory” is a hypothesis that has
been conﬁrmed overwhelmingly by evidence. In contrast, an axiom is an assumption that is generally held to be true, without conﬁrmation.
A fact is generally accepted as true, whether it is proved or not. For example, the existence of human beings is held to be true (and is
accepted without proof or evidence) – a fact. How human beings have come into being is, on the other hand, a theory – the theory of
evolution – a hypothesis that is supported by overwhelming evidence (see Dawkins, 2009 – Chapter 1 – for a discussion of these terms). A
maintained hypothesis is in between a hypothesis and a theory but is assumed without explicit testing as the basis for examining the
research question on hand. Eﬃcient Market Hypothesis, Utility theory, Prospect theory and Functional Fixation are examples of
maintained hypotheses for most accounting studies.
154 B. Srinidhi / China Journal of Accounting Research 6 (2013) 149–1663. Conceptualization of accounting and auditing research problems using a single-entity approach: the loss
function
The concept of loss function is borrowed from Statistics and Decision theory where it is deﬁned as a func-
tion that maps an event onto a real number intuitively representing some “cost” associated with the event. We
use the notion quite broadly here to represent any situation where we could represent a trade-oﬀ faced by an
entity in choosing a parameter by the entity’s total cost of choosing it at diﬀerent levels. We normally use this
mental model of trade-oﬀ when the entity faces an uncertain environment but not when it faces one or more
strategic players.
3.1. Example 1: Auditor loss function and auditing standards
This example is developed using a simple auditor loss function but a more advanced analysis has been done
in Ye and Simunic (2012). Consider the problem of audit standard-setting where the standard requires a min-
imum (ﬂoor) eﬀort from the auditor. We view the eﬀort of the auditor broadly to include the audit hours that
are spent, specialist skills brought to bear, investments in technology, and other costs incurred on the audit. In
that sense, the audit eﬀort modeled in the loss function is for all practical purposes, a proxy for audit quality.
Conceptualization of this issue proceeds as follows:
(i) How does the auditor choose eﬀort in the absence of standards but within the current legal framework?
(ii) What eﬀect does a standard have on this eﬀort? When does a particular standard aﬀect the auditor’s
eﬀort and when does it not aﬀect the auditor’s eﬀort?
We model the direct cost of the audit – the expected cost that the auditor incurs in delivering the audit c(a) – as
a function of the audit eﬀort a. We model it as a cost that is increasing at an increasing rate – similar to most
cost functions, i.e., c0ðaÞ > 0 and c00ðaÞ > 0. The countervailing cost is the expected aggregate cost of litiga-
tion. The cost of litigation follows a joint distribution of the probability that the auditor will be sued by a
plaintiﬀ and the distribution of the (i) penalties and cost that might be imposed on the auditor; (ii) the oppor-
tunity cost of lost future business because of the potential loss of reputation; and (iii) the cost of preparing for
the defense or arbitration. We expect this cost l(a) to decrease in auditor eﬀort at a decreasing rate, i.e.,
c0ðaÞ > 0 and l00ðaÞ > 0. In the absence of any standards, the auditor will minimize c(a) + l(a). If the continuity
and diﬀerentiability assumptions hold, this will happen at a point a* where c
0
(a*) = 0. Consider an auditing
standard that can precisely require the auditor to put in an eﬀort ar. The standard will be eﬀective in the range
(a*, amax) where amax is deﬁned by the equation c(amax) = c(a*) + l(a*) but not outside that range. The reason is
that if the regulated eﬀort is less than a*, the auditor still minimizes the total cost at a* (higher than the reg-
ulated value of the eﬀort) and if the regulated eﬀort is more than amax, the auditor takes the risk of violating
the standard and is still better oﬀ supplying the eﬀort a*. This is illustrated in Fig. 2.
The advantage of this simple conceptualization is that we can draw inferences on a number of propositions.
Consider the following:
(i) If the aggregate expected litigation cost l(a) increases everywhere in a by a constant amount k, the range
of eﬀectiveness of the eﬀort regulation increases. [It is simple to see that a* is not changed but the new
upper bound of the range, cðamax1 Þ ¼ c1½cðaÞ þ lðaÞ þ k ¼ c1½k þ cðamaxÞ > amax, where c1[.] repre-
sents the inverse cost function as shown in Fig. 2a.
(ii) A larger auditor faces a higher probability of litigation and the assessed penalty for audit failure is likely
to be larger. Therefore, for a larger auditor, l’(a) is lower (more negative) than for a smaller auditor. If
we assume that the cost of providing the same eﬀort is not likely to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent compared to
smaller auditors in the same jurisdiction, the optimal eﬀort a* for the larger auditor is higher. Therefore,
larger auditors, in the absence of regulation, are expected to provide higher eﬀort leading to higher qual-
ity audits.
Figure 2a. Eﬀect of increase in l(a) on the range of eﬀectiveness.
Figure 2. Auditing Standard & Auditor Loss Function.
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for smaller auditor as aastSmall), the minimal audit eﬀort standard could be positioned between the two, i.e.,
aLarge  ar > aLarge. This will increase the quality of audits by smaller auditors but not aﬀect the higher
quality audits of larger auditors. In other words, auditing standards are aimed more at smaller auditors
to ensure that they provide audit of adequate quality.
(iv) In legal regimes such as the US where the litigation costs are higher, the optimal audit eﬀort is higher,
ceteris paribus.
(v) In jurisdictions where it is very costly to improve audit quality (eﬀort) [could be because not many audi-
tors are trained well; the independence of auditors cannot be assured; there is no support from the gov-
ernance structure], the ﬁrst derivative c’(a) is higher and this decreases the optimal audit quality.
Many of the above propositions are not obvious unless the conceptualization using the auditor loss func-
tion is made. In other words, even having this simple conceptualization can improve the understanding of the
eﬀect of standard setting on audit quality. Ye and Simunic (2012) consider two dimensions of auditing stan-
dards: toughness which is akin to the minimum eﬀort level alluded to above; and vagueness which is the uncer-
tainty in the enforcement of the standard resulting mostly from the vagueness in the language of the standard.
In that case, they show that if the toughness of the audit standard requires eﬀort from the auditor above the
(otherwise) optimal level, the auditor would prefer a vague standard over a precise standard.
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A very basic disclosure model is one that trades oﬀ the beneﬁts of disclosure with the proprietary costs that
reduce the competitive disadvantage. For example, disclosing detailed information about a new product could
convey relevant information to investors in assessing the future growth of the ﬁrm but it could also be
exploited by competitors to copy some of the features and thereby reduce the competitive advantage of the
ﬁrm releasing the information. The decrease in competitive advantage will be a reduction of ﬁrm value for
investors. Let fI(d) represent the beneﬁt to the investor arising from the additional information disclosed, d.
We model it as a function that increases in d at a diminishing rate, i.e., f 01ðdÞ > 0; f 001 ðdÞ < 0. The cost to
the investor because the ﬁrm loses some of its competitive advantage is modeled as gI(d) that is increasing
at an increasing rate with d, i.e., g1ðdÞ > 0; g001ðdÞ > 0. The optimal disclosure dI demanded by the investor sat-
isﬁes f 01ðd1Þ ¼ g01ðd1Þ. This is seen in Fig. 3 below.
The manager, on the other hand, is likely to have a diﬀerent perspective. The beneﬁts that accrue directly to
the manager by disclosing more information derive from the additional compensation that he might get when
ﬁrm value for the investor becomes higher. This beneﬁt is smaller than the beneﬁt to the investor and also
increases at a slower pace than for the investor. The propriety cost of competitive disadvantage is likely to
be higher because unlike the investor, the manager cannot diversify the risk of the loss without changing jobs.
It is also likely that the proprietary cost of the manager increases faster than that for the investor. As a result,
denoting the beneﬁts and costs for managers by functions fm(d) and gm(d) respectively, we note that
f 01ðdÞ > f 0mðdÞ and g01ðdÞ < g0mðdÞ8d which results in an optimal disclosure dm that is lower than the disclosure
dI demanded by the investor.
Some of the propositions that follow from this conceptualization are:
(i) In a setting where proprietary costs are high, the optimal disclosure demanded by investors is low.
(ii) In settings where the disclosure does not result in competitive disadvantage – could persuade competitors
to even withdraw from the market or reduce capacity – investors demand higher disclosure
(iii) In settings where managers’ compensations are not tied to ﬁrm value, the ﬁrst derivative, f 0mðdÞ is smaller
compared to the beneﬁts to the investor and managers are likely to supply much lower disclosure relative
to what is demanded by investors.
(iv) In highly competitive settings where the ﬁrst mover advantage is very valuable, investors demand less
disclosure.
(v) In settings where managers have invested signiﬁcant human capital into new product development and
other projects, the proprietary cost to the manager of disclosing the details would be very high. There-
fore, managers would supply much lower disclosure than what is demanded by investors.
(vi) In a high litigation environment such as the US, managers might face high litigation costs if there is dis-
covery of delay in (bad news) disclosures. In eﬀect, the beneﬁt of disclosure for managers becomes
higher, i.e., fm(d) and f 0mðdÞ are high. This results in more (and early) disclosure of bad news (Skinner,
1994)Figure 3. Disclosure from investors’ and managers’ viewpoints.
Figure 4. Trade-oﬀ in conservatism.
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Accounting conservatism has been deﬁned in modern accounting literature as the accountant’s tendency to
require a higher degree of veriﬁcation for good news compared to bad news (Basu, 1997; Watts, 2003a,b).3 At
the most extreme, all expenditures could be recognized as expenses, resulting in no recognized assets on the
balance sheet. It is obvious that such an extreme form of conservatism does not exist in the current practice
of accounting. By recognizing future losses and other expenditures while deferring future gains and revenues,
the reported income becomes biased. Such a bias is costly because an auditor-certiﬁed deferred gains and rev-
enues might be more useful to the investor in valuing the ﬁrm than the good news obtained from non-account-
ing sources. However, such veriﬁcation is costly and at the optimum, the ﬁrm needs to trade oﬀ the cost of
veriﬁcation against the cost of bias introduced by conservative reporting. We describe the degree of conserva-
tism as u and model the cost of veriﬁcation as cm(u). The cost of veriﬁcation decreases as the report becomes
more conservative, but it decreases at a diminishing rate. This means that c0mð/Þ < 0 and c00m ð/Þ > 0. We also
model the cost of bias in the information cb(u) to be increasing in u at an increasing rate, i.e.,
c0bð/Þ > 0 and c00bð/Þ > 0. The optimal level of conservatism demanded by investors is found at a point u*
where c0mð/Þ þ c0bð/Þ. This is shown in Fig. 4.
Investor demand for conservatism can be conceptualized based on the above trade-oﬀ. As an example, con-
sider the diﬀerence between high- and low-technology ﬁrms. High-technology ﬁrms and high growth ﬁrms
have very uncertain futures. This increases the direct cost and the risk of verifying any news about the future.
For example, verifying that inventory does not lose value till they are sold in a few months’ time would be
more diﬃcult in a high-technology ﬁrm than say in a ﬁrm that manufactures farm equipment. Therefore,
the cost of veriﬁcation and its rate of decrease are both higher, i.e., c0mð/Þ is lower (more negative). This makes
the optimal conservatism for high-tech ﬁrms, /HThigher than that for similar low tech ﬁrms, /

LT . Optimally,
investors demand conservative reports from high growth and/or high-tech ﬁrms that are characterized by
greater uncertainty. This trade-oﬀ is shown in Fig. 4a.
Managers, however, personally incur a very small part, if at all, of the veriﬁcation costs. The cost of bias is
borne by investors. Conservatism could be costly to managers if their compensation depends on accounting
income because deferring good news will also defer their compensation. In the absence of any restriction, man-
agers will perhaps choose unbiased reporting of good news and perhaps withhold some of the bad news –
resulting in an aggressive report. The “supply” of conservatism by managers will be lower than the demand
for conservatism by investors. The cost of conservatism for the unrestricted manager is shown in Fig. 4b. In3 We have adopted the notion of conditional conservatism – the conservative practice of recognizing bad news and losses while deferring
good news and gains. Unconditional conservatism, on the other hand, is independent of the news. A standard that requires research
expenditures to be expensed is unconditionally conservative. On the other hand, a rule such as lower of cost or market for inventories is
conditionally conservative in that any impairment of inventory value is recognized but increases in inventory value are deferred till the
inventory becomes part of sales.
Figure 4a. Conservatism demanded in high and low tech ﬁrms.
Figure 4b. Cost of conservatism for the unrestricted manager.
Figure 4c. Cost of conservatism for the GAAP-restricted manager–diﬀerent audit quality settings.
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lowest degree of conservatism.
This conceptualization shows that if investors’ demand for conservatism is to be satisﬁed, it needs to be
imposed on managers. GAAP does this by requiring managers to comply with conservative accounting rules
and having a third-party auditor audit the report. If the auditor is strict and GAAP is followed, the minimum
conservatism will be set at uGAAP. If the auditor is lax, GAAP might not be strictly enforced and the manager
might supply a level of conservatism, / < /GAAP. In the case of most ﬁrms, /GAAP  /0. If that is not the case,
i.e., if /GAAP > /
0, the conservatism deployed by managers will be forced to be higher than that demanded by
investors, which is a sub-optimality caused by onerous GAAP regulations. However, when /GAAP  /0, the
Figure 4d. Cost of conservatism for the manager under diﬀerent governance settings.
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rights and would institute internal procedures to satisfy the investors’ demand. These trade-oﬀs are shown in
Figs. 4b–d.
Some of the propositions that follow from this conceptualization are:
If GAAP reﬂects investor demand for conservatism, jurisdictions with stronger enforcement, stronger legal
system, and a non-interfering political system will exhibit greater conservatism than other jurisdictions
(Bushman and Piotroski, 2006).
Firms with institutional ownership will exhibit higher conservatism because institutional investors are
better able than retail investors to impose their demand on managers (Ramalingegowda and Yu, 2012).4. The use of multiple entity approach to conceptualize problems in accounting and auditing research: game theory
Although the conceptualization of many accounting issues using a single-entity perspective facing trade-oﬀs
is useful, it is often not appropriate in situations where the entity faces one or more strategic players who react
to the actions of the entity. The trade-oﬀ/loss-function approach assumes implicitly that the entity is facing an
uncertain environment where the probability distributions facing the entity are not aﬀected by its actions. In
contrast, in an environment with strategic players, each player will try to maximize its own self-interest and
therefore, for diﬀerent actions, there will be diﬀerent reaction functions that determine the resulting equilib-
rium. In that sense, conceptualization using strategic games could be diﬀerent and richer than conceptualiza-
tion using the single-entity framework.
The concept of equilibrium that is most useful in conceptualization of accounting problems in the game-
theoretic framework is that of Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium is one in which no player has a unilateral
incentive to seek out a diﬀerent action. On the other hand, the Pareto-optimal solution is one in which it is not
possible to improve the payoﬀ of any one of the players without decreasing the payoﬀ of another. The Nash
equilibrium could be diﬀerent from the Pareto-optimal solution. In other words, the players in Nash equilib-
rium could be better oﬀ using a diﬀerent set of actions but by deﬁnition, no player has the incentive to uni-
laterally deviate from the Nash equilibrium strategy. Such Nash equilibrium would be a dysfunctional
Nash equilibrium. A particular class of problems with dysfunctional Nash equilibrium is the Prisoner’s
dilemma illustrated in the payoﬀ matrix between two players below. There are two parties A and B who can-
not credibly communicate (meaning that even if they could communicate and arrive at an agreement to coop-
erate with each other, there is no ex-post enforcement mechanism to enforce the agreement. As a result, the
agreement will be broken at will and such a break will be anticipated correctly by the other party) with each
other and have to choose one of the two actions each – Cooperate (C) or Defect (D). The payoﬀs (Party A
payoﬀ, Party B payoﬀ) are given in the corresponding cells of the Table. The notations are R: reward for
mutual cooperation; T: Temptation payoﬀ; S: Sucker’s payoﬀ; P: Punishment for mutual defection.
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Cooperate (C) (R, R) = (3,3) (S, T) = (0,5)
Defect (D) (T, S) = (5,0) (P, P) = (1,1)Consider the payoﬀs of the choices of Party A if Party B cooperates. A would prefer D over C because
T > R (i.e., he can get 5 by defecting, which is higher than the 3 he gets by cooperation). If Party B defects,
then also A would prefer D over C because P > S (i.e., he can get 1 by defecting, which is higher than the 0 he
gets by cooperation). In this case, irrespective of B’s strategy, A prefers to defect. This strategy choice is called
dominant strategy. Because of symmetry, a similar logic applies to B who prefers to defect also. This results in
Nash equilibrium (D, D). It is easy to see that the Pareto-optimal choice is (cooperate, cooperate), but that is
not Nash equilibrium and will not be deployed. Even if this game is repeated and the two parties agree to alter-
nate between (defect, cooperate) and (cooperate, defect) strategies, each will, on average, get a payoﬀ of 2.5,
which is still lower than the Pareto-optimal payoﬀ. [Mixing two strategies using a pre-deﬁned probability will
make it a game that allows randomized strategies but I will limit this essay to pure strategies, because the moti-
vation of the essay is to conceptualize, rather than develop sophisticated models.] Dysfunctional Nash equi-
librium will prevail as long as two conditions are satisﬁed: T > R > P > S; (T + S)/2 < R. I reiterate that the
Prisoner’s dilemma is only one class of games where the dysfunctional Nash equilibrium exists and is
dominant.
4.1. Implications of dysfunctional Nash equilibrium for accounting research
The ﬁrst implication of the existence of dysfunctional Nash equilibrium in games is that the optimization
carried out using the trade-oﬀ and loss functions in Section 1 might not be feasible. This observation goes to
the heart of many arguments I have found in papers that implicitly or even explicitly assume that the empirical
ﬁndings must represent the best strategies for the concerned parties. Unfortunately, this assertion is often
incorrect.
The second implication concerns the role of regulation and standard setting. One way of understanding the
role of regulation and standard setting (which clearly put restrictions on the workings of the free market) is
that they could prevent some dysfunctional Nash equilibrium and thereby nudge the parties towards a Pareto-
optimal solution.
I give below some examples of conceptualization using game theory.
4.2. Example: Conceptualization of the auditor–manager game using game theory
The details of the conceptualization of the reporting by managers and the resulting eﬀort and investment
that the auditor puts into the engagement at two levels of expected litigation cost are given in Appendix A. The
investor is also a player but is not explicitly modeled here to keep the game simple. The investor is assumed to
aﬀect the payoﬀ of the auditor through the credibility of ﬁnancial statements. The manager is modeled as hav-
ing two choices – reporting truthfully (Honest) or reporting with some manipulation (Dishonest), whereas the
auditor has the choice of providing a low or high quality audit. In the auditor loss function modeling given
earlier, higher auditor quality increased direct audit costs but decreased the expected loss from litigation and
reputation loss that accompany an audit failure. However, if the manager is honest, there is no loss from lit-
igation costs from a low quality audit, but there might be lower credibility for the investor, resulting in lower
audit fees (through board negotiations). When the manager is dishonest, and the auditor provides a lower
quality audit, there could be litigation costs as well. In other words, the auditor loss function depends on
the manager’s action and so, the auditor could implement diﬀerent qualities depending on his expectation
of the manager’s actions – and the manager’s actions could diﬀer based on the manager’s expectation of
whether the auditor provides a high or low quality audit.
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Low quality audit) – which points to an implicit collusion between the manager and the auditor. The desired
outcome is (Honest, High quality audit) but if the manager is honest, the auditor has an incentive to provide a
low quality audit. Further, if the auditor provides a low quality audit, the manager has the incentive to be
dishonest. In the example that is given, increasing the litigation cost removes the dysfunctional Nash equilib-
rium above but replaces it with (Dishonest, High quality audit). If the high quality audit “exposes” the dis-
honest manager, the manager’s payoﬀ could be modeled as being less under when the manager is dishonest
(In the southwest cell, the manager’s payoﬀ could be l00) and this could make the Pareto-optimal solution
(Honest, High quality audit) the only Nash equilibrium.
4.3. Example: Conceptualization of opportunistic earnings management as equilibrium in manager–investor game
Recall the argument made earlier in the Introduction that opportunistic earnings management might
not be in the equilibrium solution if investors are rational and see though such manipulations by manage-
ment. In that case, they discount the earnings report and the manager gains nothing by managing earnings
– which inevitably leads to the conclusion that opportunistic earnings management requires behavioral
deviation from economic rationality on the part of the investor. However, this logic ignores an important
aspect of the game. The eﬀort of the manager is not observable, and therefore, it is rational for the inves-
tor (principal) to transfer some risk in the output to the manager (agent). Moreover, the output is not
observable to the investor but will be known to the manager. The investor could require the manager
to report the output but constrain misreporting by an auditing-governance system. The report can be
made completely truthful about the output only at an exorbitant cost of audit and governance. At normal
governance and audit levels, the manager could manage earnings by reporting high earnings when the
actual output is low and to the extent that the audit system does not correct it, the “managed” earnings
will be in the ﬁnal report to the investor. Under reasonable conditions given in Appendix B, it is seen that
the equilibrium is reached when the manager manages income but puts in high eﬀort and the investor pro-
vides incentive compensation. The two ways in which the investor can get truthful reporting are by (i)
providing ﬁxed compensation in which case, the manager does not mind telling the truth but has no
incentive to deploy high eﬀort; or (ii) employing a very costly monitoring procedure that ensures truth
telling but has a very high deadweight cost. Neither of these solutions is palatable to the investor. The
better solution is for the investor to provide incentive compensation that is increasing in the reported out-
come and have a moderate governance and auditing system that constrains but does not eliminate earn-
ings management. In equilibrium, the investor fully expects the manager to manage income but is still
willing to use the managed income as the basis of incentive compensation. Note that this equilibrium
holds even in multi-period settings as long as the eﬀort in a period produces output only in that period
and contingent contracts are not feasible. This conceptualization enables us to understand why we observe
opportunistic earnings management even within rational modeling of both the manager and the investor.
4.4. Example: Conceptualization of the Analyst-Manager game to explain biases in analyst forecasts and
recommendations
In the absence of strategic responses from managers of the ﬁrms that they cover, it would be rational
for analysts to provide unbiased earning estimates and recommendations to investors. In such equilibrium,
the accuracy of the analyst forecast will be normally high and the precision depends on the skill and eﬀort
levels of the analyst. However, there is considerable literature on analysts being optimistic or otherwise
biased in their earnings forecasts and recommendations of the stock of the ﬁrms they cover (Lim,
2001; Das et al., 1998). The game tree given in Appendix C provides the rationale for the bias in analyst
forecasts. Consider the case where the prior information on the ﬁrm is bad in that it is facing some ﬁnan-
cial diﬃculties. The analyst has the choice of being truthful and making a sell recommendation on this
stock as well as giving a downbeat prediction of earnings. Alternatively, the analyst could present a rosier
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likely to be ruﬄed because of the increased probability of the ﬁrm going bankrupt and thereby wasting
the non-diversiﬁable human capital that the manager has put into the ﬁrm. The consequence to the ana-
lyst is likely to be reduced access to the manager’s and ﬁrm’s closely held information. On the other hand,
if the analyst produces an optimistic forecast, the access to future information is not reduced. This makes
it likely that the analyst will choose the latter course and produce an optimistic report. The investor will
rationally anticipate this optimism and is not hurt much because he will trim the recommendation of the
analyst. In the case where there is no ﬁnancial diﬃculty for the ﬁrm, the dynamics are diﬀerent. An opti-
mistic forecast will make it diﬃcult for the manager to beat the estimate and thereby try to maximize his
incentive compensation. A non-optimistic forecast will make the process of beating the estimate a little
easier for the manager. Therefore, one could expect a rational analyst to provide a non-optimistic forecast
for ﬁrms that are doing well.
5. Conclusions
This essay has provided two ways of conceptualizing several accounting and audit research problems.
The ﬁrst one is the single-entity approach in which the problem is conceptualized as a trade-oﬀ between
diﬀerent costs or the maximization of costs and beneﬁts when the world outside the entity in question is
modeled as non-strategic but uncertain. This is a reasonable model if the entity operates in relative iso-
lation or if the environment consists of a large number of players each one of whom has little ability
to control the reaction to the actions of the entity. A competitive market is a good example of such
an environment. However, in most cases that we encounter in accounting and auditing research, this
assumption is not satisﬁed. There are other entities that are strategic and their reaction is driven by their
own self-interest and therefore cannot be modeled as random. In these cases, game theory provides a good
framework for conceptualization of the problems. I have provided some examples of conceptualization
using these frameworks.
In conclusion, it is my hope that this essay contributes in a small measure to transforming the nature of
accounting and auditing research undertaken by Ph.D. students and several younger colleagues. In particular,
I hope that the extreme focus on econometrics and statistical reasoning is balanced by a greater conceptual-
ization of the issues in a way that allows the researcher to better interpret and understand empirical results.
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Appendix A.
Auditor–manager. game
Auditors can provide a high quality audit (with cost) or a low quality audit (no cost).
Managers can be completely honest or engage in income manipulation (dishonest).
When the audit quality is low, manager’s compensation might be lower because there is less credibility in
the manager.
Auditor’s payoﬀ = Audit fees  Audit cost.
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The payoﬀs in cells are (manager’s payoﬀ, auditor’s payoﬀ).AuditorHigh Quality Audit (HQA) Low Quality Audit(LQA)
Manager Honest (H) (100,10) (80,15)Dishonest (D) (100,0) (90,10)Cell (H, HQA): This payoﬀ matrix is based on the following assumption when the manager is honest and
the auditor provides a high quality audit, manager’s compensation is $100, and the auditor incurs the normal
audit cost $5 and gets a fee $15. His payoﬀ is $15  $5 = $10.
Cell (D, HQA): When the manager is dishonest but the auditor provides a high quality audit, the manager’s
report is corrected and he receives the same compensation of $100. (It could be more because of residual
expropriation but I choose to ignore it) The auditor has to put in additional eﬀort to identify the managed
amounts and revise the report. His cost increases to $15 and the payoﬀ = $15  $15 = $0.
Cell (H, LQA): The manager is honest but the auditor provides a low quality audit and the decreased cred-
ibility in the report reduces the manager’s compensation to $80. The auditor incurs no cost and gets a fee of
$15. His payoﬀ is $15.
Cell (D, LQA): The manager is dishonest and expropriates an amount of $10 in addition to the compen-
sation of $80. The manager’s payoﬀ = $90. The auditor gets his fee of $15, but suﬀers an expected litigation
cost of $5. His payoﬀ = $10.
Analysis: This is a prisoner’s dilemma case.
If the manager is honest, the auditor gets a higher payoﬀ of $15 by providing LQA ($15 > $10). If the man-
ager is dishonest, the auditor gets a higher payoﬀ of $10 by providing LQA ($10 > $0). Irrespective of the man-
ager’s action, the auditor is better oﬀ with LQA.
If the auditor provides HQA, the manager is indiﬀerent between being honest and dishonest (gets $100 in
both cases).
If the auditor provides LQA, the manager is better oﬀ being dishonest (gets $90 instead of $80). Irrespective
of the auditor’s action, the manager is better oﬀ being dishonest. Therefore, the equilibrium in this period
game is (Dishonest, LQA). The preferred outcome is (Honest, HQA).
If the expected litigation cost for the auditor providing LQA = $18 (say) [Any number P15]. The payoﬀ
matrix will be changed to the following:AuditorHigh Quality Audit (HQA) Low Quality Audit(LQA)
Manager Honest (H) (100,10) (80,15)Dishonest (D) (100,0) (90,3)We have assumed that the litigation cost = 0 if the manager is honest or if the auditor supplied a high qual-
ity audit. Only in the case of (Dishonest, LQA), auditor payoﬀ = $15(auditor fee)  $18(litigation
cost) = $3.
In this case, the manager’s equilibrium action is not changed. If the manager is dishonest, however, the
auditor anticipates this and given that the manager’s action is dishonest, the auditor’s optimal response is
HQA. The equilibrium in this game would change to (Dishonest, HQA).
The conceptualization is diﬀerent from the earlier loss function conceptualization in that the auditor’s loss
depends on the manager’s action which is not random.
164 B. Srinidhi / China Journal of Accounting Research 6 (2013) 149–166Appendix B.
Investor. – manager game – earnings management
In this example, I model the interaction between investors and managers as a one-period principal-agent
game. The description of the game follows.
Description. of the game
We model a risk-neutral manager who engages in a productive eﬀort that can take two values: High and
Low. The eﬀort itself is not observable. The output of the agency is valuable to the investor who is also risk
neutral. The output is uncertain and can take two values: xh and xL where xh > xL. The probability of getting
the high output xh is higher with high eﬀort. I denote the probability of high output conditional on high eﬀort
as ph and the probability of getting high output conditional on low eﬀort as pL, i.e., Prob (xh|High eﬀort) = ph
and Prob(xh|Low eﬀort) = pL. Correspondingly, Prob (xL|High eﬀort) = 1  ph and Prob(xL|Low
eﬀort) = 1  pL.
The output is privately observable to the manager but is not observable to the investor. The investor
engages a third-party auditor to verify the reported outcome. The manager reports the outcome to the auditor
who veriﬁes it and presents the ﬁnal report (after revision if the audit reveals a wrong report) to the investor.
The auditor can be asked by the investor to apply an intensive audit which is very costly (the audit is denoted
as HIGH and its cost is denoted as AH) that will ensure that the manager’s report is always corrected (100%
success rate for the audit) to the actual output. With this audit, the investor always gets an accurate report of
the output. Alternatively, the investor can ask the auditor to apply a moderate audit denoted as LOW with a
much lower cost denoted by AL and a success rate of p, i.e., it detects wrong reports with a probability p and
corrects them before sending them to the investor. There is a probability of (1  p) where the manager can get
away reporting the high output when the output is low.
The investor compensates the manager either by a share of the output s, i.e., the compensation = s  Final
report by the auditor (called INCENTIVE COMPENSATION) or by a ﬁxed amount K (called FIXED COM-
PENSATION). In either case, the expected compensation should cover the reservation wages of the agent
(which is the same as K).
The manager incurs a cost (disutility of eﬀort) of V if he supplies the HIGH eﬀort but no cost if he supplies
the LOW eﬀort.
The payoﬀ table and the equilibrium
The payoﬀ table given here shows the payoﬀ s to the investor and manager under diﬀerent choices. We
make the following assumptions on the values of the variables:
AH  AL. Moreover, AH is too costly to implement for the investor. Therefore, the AUDIT = HIGH rows
in the table are dominated by the AUDIT = LOW rows.
For ease of presentation, I denote the expected outputs as follows:
The expected output with high eﬀort = OH ¼ PhX h þ ð1 PhÞXL
The expected output with low eﬀort = OL ¼ PLX h þ ð1 PLÞXL
If ﬁxed compensation is given, it is clear that the manager prefers K over K  V and therefore chooses low
eﬀort. This will produce an output OL < OH and the investor will have a payoﬀ of OL  K  AL. On the other
hand, if incentive compensation is given, the manager will work for this agency and choose HIGH eﬀort over
LOW eﬀort if the following conditions are satisﬁed:
1  s  VpðxhxLÞðphpLÞ The ﬁrst part of this condition will make the sharing possible. The second part is the
incentive compatibility condition that will make the manager prefer HIGH eﬀort over LOW eﬀort.
s  kþVpðxhxLÞð1pLÞ This individual rationality constraint will make the manager’s expected payoﬀ equal to his
reservation utility K.
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the earnings report and the audit technology allows some earnings management to go undetected and uncor-
rected. Because of condition (ii), the manager is at least weakly better oﬀ with the incentive compensation and
because of condition (i), the manager prefers to put in high eﬀort instead of low eﬀort in spite of the higher
cost of doing so. The investor beneﬁts by higher outcome that he can retain.
I note that the investor beneﬁts from higher eﬀort because of two reasons: (i) xh > xL; (ii) ph > pL. The
higher the diﬀerential between high and low outputs and the higher the diﬀerential between high and low
eﬀorts in determining the probability of higher output, the greater is the incentive for the investor to induce
higher eﬀort. From condition (i), these two reasons can reduce the minimum value of s. Because the audit is
not always successful, the manager exploits the system to manage earnings. However, from condition (ii), note
that if p is low, the reservation utility of the agent can be satisﬁed by a low s because the manager rationally
expects to manage earnings, “mislead” the investor and earn higher compensation. The investor, on the other
hand, rationally expects the manager to engage in such behavior and correspondingly can reduce s and still
expect the manager to work for the ﬁrm.
I also caution here that this is a highly stylized and simpliﬁed model and should not be mistaken to be a
comprehensive model for explaining earnings management. I have assumed a risk-neutral manager which,
technically, should result in an optimal solution where the investor rents out the facility to the manager
and the manager implements the ﬁrst best solution. I have also reduced the problem to simple binary values
of eﬀort, output, and audit technology. Yet, it captures the intuition that information asymmetry about the
outcome forces the investor to tolerate earnings management in order to reduce moral hazard and motivate
a higher eﬀort on the part of the manager.
Equilibrium is the boxed square in the table. Investor provides incentive compensation. Manager chooses
high eﬀort but manages earnings.
PAYOFF Table.
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